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Abstract: Digital convergence thrusts telephony, television and the internet into the so-
called 'triple play' offerings, creating new forms of rivalry between cable operators and 
telephone companies. Markets participants feel compelled to enter new industries to 
survive, even though their core competencies are limited to their primary market. The 
outcome of triple play competition is likely to depend on the speed of the development of 
new technologies and the adaptation of the regulatory environment. In the short run, 
telephone companies will enjoy an advantage attributable to switching costs. However, 
this advantage will erode as younger subscribers switch to telephony on the internet. 
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ven though it remains true that pictures, sounds and written data 
eventually reach our brain through airwaves and electromagnetic 
radiation, all this information is now processed, stored and transmitted 
as digits. This digital homogeneity has recently facilitated important changes 
in the structure of the Information, Communication and Entertainment (ICE) 
industries, as well as in the R&D and marketing strategies of the firms in this 
sector.  
New forms of rivalry have emerged between hardware producers who 
would not have competed in the past. Mobile telephone producers have 
entered new fields: some have integrated personal digital assistants into the 
handset (for example, the Sony Ericsson P900), music players (for example, 
the Sony Ericsson W800), credit cards (for example, the DoCoMo Mobile 
Wallet). Most handsets now have an integrated camera. Similarly, personal 
digital assistants now come with a built-in phone (for example, Treo), gaming 
consoles can be used for voice calls (for example, the Nokia's N-Gage), and 
E 
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messaging devices can include the telephone as a secondary component 
(for example, the BlackBerry) 1. 
Alongside this mutation in hardware, there has been an important change 
in "content." Digital products are now commonly tied to each other. The 
seller supplies a basket of communication services that includes 
telecommunications (voice and instant messages), television and access to 
the internet. The incumbent operators of fixed-telephone networks such as 
Verizon, SBC and BellSouth in America, BT, France Telecom and Deutsche 
Telekom in Europe already deliver TV programmes, as well as voice-over-
internet-protocol (VoIP) via high-speed DSL telephone lines or fibre-optic 
networks. This is only the beginning. In South Korea, TU Media is testing 
mobile TV services; while Nokia is doing the same in Europe and America. 
The convergence between media (mainly TV), telephone, and broadband 
is apparent to all: it has been dubbed "triple-play" 2. This convergence is a 
challenging topic for the economist because it raises unexplored issues with 
regard to strategic behavior and an additional slew of antitrust issues. To 
see why, we only need to consider the following: 1) lack of transparency 
resulting from bundling; 2) the exclusive access to an essential technology 
by dominant actors; 3) cross subsidization that accompanies competition 
between "triple players" and "single-service providers" and 4) bundling of 
services regulated by different agencies with different traditions and rules. 
This paper explores the effects of digital convergence between 
telephony, television and internet into the "triple play adventure." In the first 
section, we set out the main features of the convergence between electronic 
services. The second section recalls the economic principles of tying, 
focusing on efficiency and the antitrust implications of bundling by a 
dominant player. The following section extends the analysis to a competitive 
environment that more closely matches the rivalry between the players 
engaged in the developing war in ICE industries. This is followed by a few 
examples of recent cases involving bundling of digital services and some 
conclusions. 
                     
1 Most stylized facts quoted in this paper are from The Economist: "TV on your phone" (January 
13th 2005), "The device that ate everything?" (March 12th 2005), "The war of the wires" (July 30th 
2005), "The meaning of free speech" (September 17th 2005), "The teachings of the Virgin" 
(January 21st 2006), "Old mogul, new media" (January 21st 2006). 
2 An offering is referred to as "quadruple-play" when mobile phone is added to the bundle. 
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  Bundling ICE services 
The convergence of the supply of Information, Communication and 
Entertainment (ICE) has sparked a battle between telecoms-firms, cable-
operators and internet-providers for the market in fixed-line telephone 
services. The traditional suppliers of telephony are facing tremendous 
competitive pressure from players like Skype that offer voice over the 
internet network (VoIP) at rock bottom prices. Concurrently, the telephone 
companies are entering the entertainment market. In the USA, for example, 
the second largest Baby Bell, SBC, has launched IPTV – a television 
channel that supplies content via upgraded broadband connections. Cable 
firms such as Comcast, Cablevision and others offer subscriptions to triple-
play bundles. France Telecom, the dominant player in French telephony, 
now offers its 'MaLigne tv' product -a DSL line - to 100 cities, and reaches 
over 20 million households 3. Its closest competitor – Free – currently has 
159,000 subscribers to TV-over-DSL services. 
Traditional telecoms firms try to meet the challenge by taking over VoIP 
carriers and switching from the technology of circuit-switched networks to 
internet-based networks. This, however, appears inadequate as a means of 
stopping the invasion of their markets by players using other digital 
technologies. It seems increasingly obvious that they all will have to enter 
the entertainment and internet worlds and will bundle all services. 
Traditional telecoms firms face a double challenge. The investments 
required in fibre-optic lines and upgrades of standard copper wires into high-
speed DSL lines are massive 4. The firms also have to install a 'residential 
gateway' in each house to connect the telephone, the computer and the TV 
set. To conquer the broadband universe, they must also invest in software 
including: compression formats, transfer protocols, compatibility standards, 
etc.  
                     
3 The customers of the 'MaLigne tv' service purchase tickets that can then be debited for on-
demand movies and programmes. France Telecom expects to have 180,000 IPTV subscribers 
by the end of 2005, thus tripling its subscriber base in one year. 
4 A temporary way of entering the TV business is to form an alliance with a satellite-TV operator 
(at the moment, satellite cannot offer triple-play), but this hardly solves the problem in the long 
run because it involves maintaining and developing two distinct heterogeneous transmission 
infrastructures. In France, Wanadoo (France Telecom) offers its broadband subscribers a 
discount on contracts with the two French satellite operators (TPS and Canalsat). 
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The second challenge is to adapt the telephone culture to the 
entertainment world. As shown by figure 1, the telephone operator is 
essentially a passive hub of a star network that connects consumers who 
produce content. Each telephone call is a specific two-way service with 
endogenous content and duration. The telephone company provides the 
platform, that is, it plays a mere technical role. By contrast, the cable firm 
controls a one-way mass service. It is responsible for technical quality, but 
also has to deal with content producers and to some extent determines 
content 5. 
Figure 1 - Two business models 
 
 
                     
5 In North America, there is essentially vertical disintegration and the cable distributor plays a 
minor role in supplying content. There are firms which supply the channels to a cable distributor 
who arranges for the bundling of channels and pricing. The firms that sell the channels to cable 
distributors generally acquire the content that they put in the channel from independent content 
suppliers. These firms are often paid by the cable distributors on a per subscriber basis. The 
suppliers of channels may also produce some of the content that they put in the channel 
themselves. 
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The selection and marketing of content (CRAMPES & HOLLANDER, 
2005) requires skills that have little in common with expertise in the 
management and pricing of voice. Moreover, fixed-line operators do not 
have an established relationship with content providers, which can be 
detrimental for entering TV market. The major competitive asset of the 
telephone companies is a penetration rate of almost 100%. The penetration 
rate of internet and pay-TV is for now significantly lower 6.  
The next section considers the role played by bundling in the competitive 
struggle driven by convergence. It examines both the pro-competitive and 
anti-competitive features of bundling.  
  Tying and bundling: pro or anti-competitive?  
Tying generally refers to an action whereby the sale of a product – for 
example toner cartridges – is made conditional to the purchase of another 
product from the seller – a printer. It is achieved via contract or technical 
compatibility. Pure bundling denotes the practice whereby the seller 
combines a fixed number of units of one product with a fixed number of units 
of one or more other products in a single package and limits the choice of 
buyers to purchase of the package or nothing at all (for example, the week-
end newspaper bundled with a magazine). By contrast, a mixed bundling 
regime allows consumers to choose between the aforementioned bundle 
and the purchase of the individual components of the bundle (European 
Commission, 2005, p. 54).  
Tying creates long-run dependency of consumers. Bundling makes it 
possible to increase short-run revenues by imposing the sale of goods with 
low utility. These methods should therefore be clearly distinguished like they 
are in legal cases. Nevertheless, the strategic differences are less important 
than their common characteristics. To keep things as simple as possible, we 
will regard bundling and tying as synonymous in this paper 7. 
                     
6 In the OECD countries, the broadband penetration rate reached 11.8 subscribers per 100 
inhabitants in June 2005. Korea is the world leader with 25.5 subscribers per 100 inhabitants. In 
the US, the rate is 14.5% and in France 12.8%. The breakdown of broadband technologies is as 
follows: DSL: 61.2%, cable modem: 32.0%, other technologies: 6.8%, (e.g. fibre optics, LAN, 
satellite and fixed wireless). Source www.oecd.org/statsportal. 
7 For a comprehensive overview on bundling, see section 7 of STOLE (2003). For the antitrust 
aspects, see MOTTA (2004). 
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During the last two decades, bundling has become a hot topic for 
Industrial Organization economists, mainly as a result of legal actions 
against Microsoft 8. Historically the theoretical literature on bundling and 
tying has primarily considered two cases: 1) the case of a monopolist who is 
not threatened by entry and uses these techniques as a substitute to 
discrimination allowing greater extraction of consumer surplus (BAKOS & 
BRYNJOLFSSON, 1999); 2) the case of an incumbent monopolist 
threatened by an outsider for whom the strategy serves as a means to 
foreclose entry (REY & TIROLE, 2005). In the latter case, the basic 
economic model depicts a monopoly tying one exclusive product to some 
other product also sold by active competitors. To capture the economics of 
triple play, one must look at more recent work that models bundling by 
several firms already active in separate markets and competing in the 
bundle extended market. We will revisit this point later in the paper. 
Bundling allows several direct gains. One possible gain derives from 
economies of scope over high-speed phone lines and economies of scale in 
billing and marketing. Bundling also expands players' strategy space. For 
instance, bundling together TV, broadband and phone increases customer 
loyalty since it makes it harder to switch from one provider to another. The 
economists have long viewed bundling as potentially dangerous behaviour 
for competition – the so-called "leverage theory" – … except that the only 
theoretical works available, most of them from the University of Chicago, 
tended to prove its harmlessness (POSNER, 1976). The leverage theory of 
bundling holds that a firm with monopoly power in market A can restrict 
competitors' sales in market B. The objection by Chicago economists was 
that in a competitive market for good B, monopoly A could attract consumers 
only by fixing a price below marginal cost, which is not profitable. Therefore, 
they considered that bundling should not be suspected of having an 
exclusionary purpose. WHINSTON (1990) has shown that if one relaxes the 
assumption that market B is competitive and that production takes place 
under constant returns to scale, the monopoly in A can benefit from the 
exclusion of competitors in market B. Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
                     
8 Many economists consider that bundling has been the main driver for the development of 
Microsoft, long before the Explorer and Media Player cases. For example, NALEBUFF (2000) 
writes: "... a firm that creates or simply aggregates a bundle of complementary software 
applications would have a substantial pricing advantage over its rivals and thereby achieve a 
leadership position in the market. This is especially true as the bundle grows in scale. Thus, 
Microsoft’s taking the lead in creating a software application bundle – putting together word-
processing, spreadsheet, presentation, HTML editing, and email applications – may help 
explain the stunning market success of the Microsoft Office suite". 
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there can never be an efficiency gain from tying, and from the triple play 
offer in particular. We examine the efficiency gains in the following 
subsection. We then discuss the profit incentive for bundling and its 
anticompetitive consequences. 
The social gains from bundling 
When the goods within the bundle encompass economies of scope 
and/or when they are always consumed jointly by the buyers, it can be 
welfare increasing to have one single producer and seller. Bundling may 
allow a saving in production, selling and administration costs (on the supply 
side) and transaction costs (on the demand side). It may also give the buyer 
the assurance that the different products in the bundle meet a certain quality 
standard. This may be of great importance when the components of the 
bundle work together as a system 9. With regard to transaction costs, it is 
true that buying from different suppliers may be time consuming, for example 
because the consumer needs to find technical information about 
compatibility. Consequently, bundling two goods or services may give 
consumers a higher net utility than if they have to buy them separately, 
either because the gross utility of joint consumption is higher than the sum of 
the separated gross utilities, or because the bundle is produced at a lower 
cost than if the elements were produced separately so that the price is lower.  
In the triple play case, one can discard the argument of utility super-
additivity. In fact, telephone, broadband access and TV are available from a 
variety of suppliers and there is little evidence that a bundle would decrease 
subscribers' costs. In other words, even if the services were complements 
for the consumer, there is no reason to purchase from a single supplier. 
Moreover, due to the digital nature of the products, one may assume that the 
transaction cost argument is not essential, even though it can be decisive at 
the margin, for example, because households prefer to receive a single bill 
and to always call the same hotline when they have a problem with one of 
the services. Obviously, this type of consumer gain is claimed by bundlers, 
although there is a lack of evidence to support this point. 
                     
9 However, efficiency gains from joint consumption can also arise from the products supplied by 
competitors. In particular, when the bundle is made up of complementary goods or services, it 
does not necessarily follow that buyers would enjoy lower utility by buying the component parts 
from independent sellers. However, the bundle is better if the exclusive producer of one of the 
goods has made it incompatible with the other goods when they are produced by a competitor --
for example when toner cartridges sold by firm A exclusively work with the printers of firm A. 
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The strongest efficiency argument in favor of triple play is based on the 
existence of economies of scope in supply. On the transmission side, 
digitalization has made sounds, pictures and data perfect substitutes that 
can be injected into the "electronic pipes". Therefore, ownership of the 
physical network that can carry any audio and video signals argues against 
specialization. This "common pipe" argument means that the operators of all 
types of e-nets have good reason to make their pipes accessible to all 
content providers. Even though digitalization has opened the doors to both 
vertical bundling (access to the pipe + supply of content) and horizontal 
bundling (several types of contents), economies of scope do not necessarily 
apply to vertical bundling. In fact, things are more complex for service 
production and consumption outside of the telephone or cable network, both 
upstream and downstream. At the downstream level, consumers still need 
distinct electronic appliances to receive and process the digits. Using a non-
adapted receiver, chances are that the pink elephant sent by the TV 
operator will look like a green donkey on the phone's screen if not like a 
boring list of 0s and 1s on the computer's screen. Nevertheless, given the 
past trend, one can rationally expect quick technological progress in this field 
so that, in the near future, households will have at their disposal 
standardized "compuTV sets" that will allow them to switch from one service 
to another by touching the screen or the keyboard. 
The main efficiency argument against triple play is upstream, at the stage 
of content production. The failure of Time Warner-AOL and Vivendi-
Universal clearly illustrates that the skills required to succeed in each of the 
three activities are very different. As indicated in the first section, consumers 
provide the content in the case of telephone. Like in a marketplace,10 the 
operator's roles are strictly technical: to ease the search of the person with 
whom the caller wants to speak and allow a high quality of secured 
connection without interfering in content between the agents who want to 
exchange voice or text.  
The internet services are quite different. Except for chat-rooms and 
blogs, there is a clear separation between the providers of services (news, 
financial data, travels, real estate, as well as video-on-demand and music-
on-demand) and the consumers of services. Moreover, there is no 
complementarity of skills between the publication of weather forecasts and 
the supply of music catalogues. As for TV programme broadcasting, this is a 
                     
10 The similarity between operating a telephone network and operating a market place explains 
Ebay’s recent takeover of Skype, the leader in VoIP, for some EUR 3 billion. 
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product with mass appeal where viewers can pick and choose. It is neither 
the consumption of a two-way service as for telephony, nor an individual 
choice among millions of products as for the internet. It is the supply of 
differentiated programmes from which each of the thousands of viewers 
select the programme s/he prefers. Therefore the safety, quality and 
regulatory requirements are not the same for telephony, internet services 
and TV programmes and the business models are quite different for each 
service. 
Budget-balancing can be an argument in favor of bundling ICE services. 
In spite of its apparently anticompetitive effects, customer loyalty can be 
necessary for operators to break even. In fact, infrastructure costs and 
media production costs are very high; conversely, variable cost per head is 
lower and keeps decreasing. It might well be that competition prevents 
telecom and cable firms from recouping their fixed costs when consumers 
only subscribe to one or two services. In that case, if a consumer with the 
gateway box of operator A in his basement, only pays A for the web 
connection and subscribes to operators B and/or C for TV and telephone, 
the revenue of A may be too low to compensate its cost. One strategy for A 
could be to use its gateway technology to blockade or to damage the 
services provided by its competitors, so that consumers have no other 
choice than to subscribe to A's bundle, with the effect of balancing the 
infrastructure budget. If quality is not observable, A can allege that the low 
quality of the competitors' service is due to exogenous reasons (virus, 
incompatibility, etc.). This problem is no different to that of long distance 
telephone operators asking for access to the local loop (see REY & TIROLE, 
2005).  
To sum up, there is little evidence of an increase in efficiency due to triple 
play. More specifically, the economies of scope achieved in the joint supply 
of TV, telephone and internet are rather low. The argument that tying is 
necessary to raise revenues enough to recoup infrastructure costs is 
dubious because 1) the three services have been developed in the past 
without being bundled and 2) revenues can be raised by the infrastructure's 
owner opening access to his essential facility. On pure efficiency grounds, 
the main social benefit of triple play could derive from enhanced competition. 
However, as shown in the next section, the main driver of bundling is to limit 
competition and to conquer adjacent markets. 
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Private gains from bundling 
The alternative argument for bundling is that it allows sellers to capture 
greater monopoly rents at the expense of consumers by engaging in price 
discrimination and by blocking access to entrants who only supply one 
product 11. We first consider the case of a firm which is a monopolist both in 
markets A and B. Then we suppose that the monopolist in A faces 
competitors in B. 
Price discrimination 
When a firm faces very heterogeneous consumers, it would like to 
propose them very different prices in order to appropriate their surplus. But 
price discrimination may be prohibited by law or be contingent to the 
availability of information about consumers' willingness to pay, that is too 
costly to acquire. If the only feasible solution is uniform pricing, the seller 
abandons some surplus to the consumers with the highest willingness-to-
pay and, additionally, does not supply all consumers with a reservation value 
higher than marginal cost. Bundling is an alternative way to price 
discriminate as the following elementary example shows. 
A monopoly sells two goods A and B to two consumers i and j. The 
willingness-to-pay of consumer i is EUR 1 for good A and EUR 2 for good B. 
The willingness-to-pay of consumer j is EUR 2 for good A and EUR 1 for 
good B. Each consumer buys at most one unit of each good. If 
discrimination is banned, (or impossible because the firm cannot identify 
who is i and who is j), the monopoly can at best earn a total profit of EUR 4 
by fixing for each good either a uniform price of EUR 1 and selling one unit 
of each good to both consumers – who enjoy a positive net surplus – or a 
uniform price of EUR 2 and selling each good only to one consumer – one 
unit of B to i and one unit of A to j. However, assuming that the reservation 
price for the package AB is exactly equal to the sum of the reservation price 
for each good, the monopoly can easily increase its profit by tying A and B 
and selling the package at the unit price EUR 3. At this price, the two 
consumers will buy the bundle and the monopoly's profits will be EUR 6. 
Bundling increases the monopolist's profit by reducing the heterogeneity of 
                     
11 In Europe, bundling cases are treated under Article 82(d) of the EC Treaty. Abuse by a 
dominant firm may consist in "making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the 
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts". 
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consumers' valuations: i and j are different in terms of preferences for A and 
B but their willingness to pay for the bundle is the same. This reduction of 
consumer heterogeneity and the existence of economies of scope are the 
main reasons why there are generalist newspapers, although readers 
display a great disparity in preferences for politics, arts, sports and other 
topics. 
When preferences are not perfectly negatively correlated like in the 
former example, pure bundling does not make it possible to extract all the 
consumers' surplus. A better solution is mixed bundling where the firm sells 
separately good A at high price Ap , good B at high price Bp  and 
simultaneously offers the package AB at a price AB A Bp p p< +  12.This 
form of second-order price discrimination allows the sorting of consumers: 
those with a strong preference for A (respectively B) buy A (respectively B), 
and the others with middle-range evaluations either buy the bundle or do not 
buy at all.  
Foreclosure 13 
We now consider the case where the monopolist in market A faces 
competition in market B. To analyze the risk of leverage through bundling, it 
is necessary to assess the technical conditions of production and 
commercialization in the tied markets. In particular, one essential feature is 
the credible ability of the dominant firm to commit to a bundle. In the 
absence of any competitor in market A, the producer will fix the monopoly 
price, denoted by Ap . Suppose that the firm simultaneously proposes good 
A alone at the monopoly price Ap  and a bundle made of good A and good B 
at a price ABp . It is clear that consumers will buy the bundle only if the 
implicit price of good B, AB Ap p− , is not larger than the price of good B sold 
                     
12 For a deeper exploration of this topic, see MATHEWSON & WINTER, 1997; BAKOS & 
BRYNJOLFSSON, 1999. 
13 "By foreclosure is meant that actual or potential competitors are completely or partially 
denied profitable access to a market. Foreclosure may discourage entry or expansion of rivals 
or encourage their exit. Foreclosure thus can be found even if the foreclosed rivals are not 
forced to exit the market: it is sufficient that the rivals are disadvantaged and consequently led 
to compete less aggressively" (European Commission, 2005, p.18). 
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by competitors. This inability to inoculate some market power from market A 
into the competitive market B has been stressed by the Chicago School 14.  
However, this is no longer true in a sequential setting where the 
monopoly can commit itself to producing only the bundle, for example by 
creating technical links or specific design: "You cannot use my VoIP service 
if you do not buy my internet connection because I use proprietary 
protocols." The exclusive sale of bundles makes the monopolist in market A 
more aggressive in market B. The argument is as follows: if the monopoly 
has committed to bundle, it must sell B to extract rents from A, which means 
the obligation to cut the implicit price of good B. The resulting lower 
equilibrium price of good B will hurt the firms that only produce good B and 
decrease their operating profits. If the resulting profit is lower than their fixed 
cost of entry, in the sub-game perfect equilibrium potential competitors stay 
out of market B when they observe that the incumbent sells a bundle 15. 
Note that this policy is also costly for the monopoly when it faces 
competitors already in the market. Bundling is profitable only when it attracts 
a sufficient number of consumers of B to compensate for the loss in revenue 
on A. When all consumers are the same, the monopolist in A will tie A and B 
only if it drives competitors out of the market. When the consumers of good 
A have heterogeneous preferences, a commitment to bundling does not 
necessarily result in foreclosure. To sum up, it is clear that "the reason for 
concern about tying by a dominant firm is that tying serves more to hurt and 
eliminate rivals from the tied market than to enhance efficiency…" (TIROLE, 
2005, p. 3). Is that true in the triple-play game where bundling is multilateral? 
                     
14 "If the price of the tied product is higher than the purchaser will have to pay on the open 
market, the difference will represent an increase in the price of the final product or service to 
him, and he will demand less of the tying product". (POSNER, 1976, p. 173). 
15 When technology does not make it possible to exclude competitors from the secondary 
market, the incumbent in the primary market can try to obtain legal exclusion from the 
secondary market, for example through a patent. But antitrust authorities can view it as a 
presumption of abuse of market power. In the Independent Ink vs. Trident case, Independent 
Ink alleged that Trident had engaged in illegal tying by conditioning the lease of Trident’s 
patented inkjet technology on the additional sale of Trident ink products. The U.S. District Court 
for the Central District of California ruled in 2002 against Independent Ink’s claim that Trident 
violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, stating that Independent Ink "failed to produce 
any evidence of market power over the tying product" (i.e., the print-head). But on January 25th, 
2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that a patent 
"presumptively defines the relevant market for the patented product itself, and creates a 
presumption of power within this market. Once the plaintiff establishes a patent tying 
agreement, it is the defendant’s burden to rebut the presumption of market power and 
consequent illegality that arises from patent tying". See HAYDEN, 2005. 
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  The multi-play game 
The preceding section dealt with bundling in markets where one firm 
could tie its products, but its rivals could not. By contrast, in the triple-play 
game several firms are attempting to capture market share by bundling. To 
explore such competition, it is best to distinguish between the following 
cases: 1) no asymmetry between rivals, and 2) initial asymmetry between 
rivals. 
Symmetrical bundle competition  
The analysis of competition between firms that offer bundles is examined 
in the framework of the so-called "mix and match" models (see MATUTES & 
REGIBEAU, 1988, 1992) 16. Their model has been revisited by several 
authors, in particular REISINGER (2004) who shows that the consequences 
of commodity bundling are less predictable in the duopoly case than in the 
monopoly case. As pointed out earlier, bundling is particularly profitable for 
the monopoly if the preferences of consumers are negatively correlated 
because it makes consumers more homogeneous (the "sorting effect") 
thereby facilitating the extraction of rents. However, in the duopoly 
framework, making consumers more homogeneous intensifies competition 
because it is less likely that sellers will focus on specific segments of 
consumers; (this additional effect is named the "business-stealing" effect.) 
This would intensify price competition and lower profits. Actually, as shown 
below, the possibility of tying creates a prisoner's dilemma situation. 
REISINGER (2004) provides an extension of the Vickrey-Salop model of 
differentiation whereby consumers are uniformly located along two circles in 
order to represent their relative preferences for two goods. Each circle 
represents one market. Two firms are active at exogenously given locations 
in both markets. They simultaneously choose their bundling and pricing 
strategy. They incur identical linear independent costs because there is no 
complementarity on the supply side. Every consumer has a unit demand for 
both goods and purchases at most one unit of each good independently of 
the other good: there is no complementarity on the demand side.  
                     
16 Actually, in MATUTES & REGIBEAU the problem is whether to make two products 
compatible. But their model, where consumers must choose between buying the products 
separately (when compatible) or from the same seller, can be easily interpreted in terms of 
bundle competition. 
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The analysis focuses on the role of correlation between the preferences 
for the two goods. Consumer prices for the two goods depend on their 
location on the circles. Therefore, the joint distribution function of reservation 
prices for the two products sold by each firm can be inferred from the joint 
distribution function of consumer locations. Moreover, from the joint 
distribution of reservation prices one can compute the correlation between 
the reservation prices. For example, if every consumer has the same 
location on both circles, then the reservation price correlation is equal to 1. 
The Reisinger's model assumes that the distance between the location on 
one circle and the location on the other circle is the same for all consumers. 
Specifically, the consumer with address x in the first market has address x+k 
in the second market, the consumer with address y in the first market has 
address y+k in the second market, and so on. This means that the larger the 
distance, the smaller the correlation of preferences for the two goods. When 
k is 0, the correlation coefficient is 1. 
Consider first the case of consumer homogeneity. Homogeneity means 
that many consumers have a strong preference for both goods being sold by 
the same firm. Consequently, the firms can behave as local monopolists and 
can extract more consumer rent with bundling. There are not many 
consumers who are almost indifferently disposed to the two bundles and 
firms do not compete to attract them. There is some business-stealing, but it 
is unimportant compared to the sorting effect. The implication is that 
bundling increases profits. Assume instead that consumer preferences are 
heterogeneous, i.e. consumers have negatively correlated willingness-to-
pay. Now bundling creates a strong 'business-stealing' effect that most likely 
dominates the sorting effect and makes bundling unprofitable.  
To gain intuition, assume that the two firms can sell their goods only in a 
bundle (pure bundling). The bundles are almost perfect substitutes and each 
firm can gain many new customers by lowering the price of its own bundle, 
that is by "stealing" them from the other firm. This results in harsh price 
competition and a decrease in profits. When the firms can implement mixed 
bundling, the same is true because the price war on the bundles influences 
the unbundled prices which are also driven down. The result is that profits 
are low and consumer rents are high.  
We observe that in the case of heterogeneous preferences, the dupolists 
are in a prisoner's dilemma situation. They both would be better off if they 
could commit not to bundle. But if one does, the competitor has no choice 
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but to do the same 17. In this case, the firms would benefit from the legal 
interdiction of tying products.  
The model also shows that welfare is lower when the firms bundle 
because of distributive inefficiency. Since the bundle is priced below the sum 
of the two independent prices, some consumers buy the bundle. An increase 
in consumer heterogeneity increases equilibrium prices for the products sold 
alone and it induces some consumers to switch to one of the bundles. This 
results in distributive inefficiency because some of these consumers have 
preferences for the products coming from different firms. So bundling 
reduces social welfare since its only effect is to oblige some consumers to 
buy the wrong good.  
The model can also be used to analyze what happens when firms choose 
their location and thereby influence the correlation of reservation prices. The 
firms may choose minimal differentiation in one product and forego profits 
from that product and still differentiate themselves from their rival in regard 
of the other product. This averts price competition on the bundle. In the USA, 
telephone companies that sell long distance service and internet access in 
one package engage in such hybrid differentiation. For instance, the long 
distance service offers included in the bundle of AT&T, Birch telecom, and 
Verizon are very similar but each firm tries to differentiate itself with respect 
to their internet offerings. Each offers different rates and different installation 
incentives:  
"AT&T offers only 20 hours per month but gives a free installation kit 
and free live support. By contrast, Birch telecom offers unlimited 
access but gives only standard support and no gifts. Verizon also 
offers unlimited access and free live support but it offers no installation 
kit. In addition, consumers can choose at Verizon if they want to buy 
DSL or wireless where wireless is a bit more expensive." (REISINGER, 
2004, p. 25). 
Asymmetrical bundle competition  
The symmetric model cannot answer all of the questions raised by the 
triple-play game. The model pays no heed to the role of an installed base. 
The latter plays an important role by reducing the responsiveness of 
consumers to small price gaps. This remains true today, even though 
                     
17 Vodaphone is the only large telephone company sticking to a mobile-only strategy. 
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switching costs have declined in ICE. Moreover, in the absence of perfect 
compatibility, network externalities give a strong advantage to incumbents 
since each of their subscribers benefit from the fact that there are many 
other subscribers to the same company. The marginal subscriber does not 
switch from one provider to another in response to a small price differential. 
The resulting viscosity creates a hysteresis effect. More pointedly, there are 
strong advantages to incumbency in a market because the number of 
customers today echoes the number of customers yesterday. So, to convey 
the essence of the triple play problem, the model must be adapted to the 
case where each firm has a relative advantage in one market (which cannot 
be the case in the circle model) before opening the game for entry in the 
other market.  
The way past outcomes impinge on actual competition in digital markets 
may differ from one firm to the other. Cable operators already have the 
expertise to programme TV content. Adding VoIP to their supply of services 
is not a difficult task when broadband access is already available. Yet they 
face two handicaps:  
• Firstly they are late entrants in the telephone industry and suffer from 
the positive network externalities of their competitors. The fact is that they 
have a small number of subscribers as compared to telephone companies, 
and the connection protocols are not perfectly compatible. Consequently 
they must offer price discounts to poach clients for VoIP from telephone 
companies. 
• Secondly, contrary to traditional fixed telephony, VoIP requires the 
home connection box to be permanently on, which is costly in energy for 
households.  
By contrast, telephone companies are newcomers to the entertainment 
industry and they will have to invest heavily to keep up with the cable firms in 
the supply of movies and football games, either by contracting with content 
producers or becoming producers. 
It is hard to identify which entry cost is higher because this depends on 
the behavior of consumers, as well as on the development of hardware and 
software techniques. For older consumers, the incumbent telephone 
companies may well retain a competitive advantage because these 
consumers are less likely to switch to new and unfamiliar providers. 
However younger consumers, already familiar with mobile telephony and the 
internet are probably easier to capture by cable operators. This means that 
the traditional telephone companies allied with satellite operators are likely to 
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ultimately lose their advantage as their loyal customers grow older. 
Nevertheless, if it takes cable operators too much time to install and control 
the electronic box that connects the home with the external world, they will 
lose the war on financial grounds because the population of youngsters will 
not be large (and rich) enough to compensate for the richer clients of 
telecom firms.  
  Examples of recent cases involving bundling of digital 
services 
The business process reengineering initiated by triple play will call for 
changes in regulation. The adaptations concern the competition authorities 
and the sectoral regulators. Some examples of recent cases are provided 
below. 
Bundling residential telephone and internet  
In 2000 British Telecom (BT) announced a new tariff package that 
bundled standard residential telephone service to unmetered off-peak 
internet access.18 The dominant telco launched the package in response to 
an offer of free internet access by the ISP provider Freeserve. The offer 
made it possible for subscribers to access the internet for the cost of a local 
phone call. The introduction of the new package by BT led to the initiation of 
an investigation by Oftel, the regulator of telecommunications. Oftel's 
concern was that the bundle would be instrumental in extending BT's 
position of dominance from retail voice calls to internet services. A second 
concern related to distortion of competition in the wholesale termination of 
internet calls.  
To assess the intentions of the dominant firm, the regulator examined 
whether the marginal price charged by BT for internet access was higher 
than the long run incremental cost it incurred by offering this service. In its 
report, the regulator concluded that the available information could not 
support a conclusion that BT was offering internet access below cost. It also 
found that the structure of competition in wholesale call termination markets 
did not warrant a concern for anti-competitive effects. It therefore concluded 
that the launch of the bundle did not infringe the Competition Act. 
                     
18 Our summary of this case is based on NALEBUFF & MAJERUS (2003). 
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VoIP and price regulation  
The French regulator of telecoms has recently determined that VoIP must 
be included into the market of fixed communications. It also established that 
competition is strong enough to justify forbearance from tariff control 
(ARCEP, 2005). On the latter, the competitors of France Telecom and the 
French competition authority strongly disagree with ARCEP (see Conseil de 
la concurrence, 2005). 
Triple-play via merger  
On December 30th, 2005 the UK's Office of Fair Trading cleared the 
proposed acquisition of Easynet by BSkyB. The merger allows BSkyB to 
offer triple-play services. The merger had raised concerns about Sky using 
its power as a seller of premium content and a buyer of non-premium 
content to block the supply of pay-TV content to DSL rivals. The OFT found 
that Sky already had the potential to do this in the absence of a merger, and 
the merger did not materially alter its incentives to block.19  
Triple play to foster competition in telephony  
Ten years after losing its monopoly, Telmex remains in control of over 
90% of the Mexican voice telephone market. Mexico has about 220 cable 
companies. On July 10th, 2006, the Federal Competition Commission 20 
issued a non binding document recommending to the Communications 
Ministry to allow cable operators to sell telephone services as soon as 
possible, and to bar telephone companies from offering television until they 
provided interconnection and number portability services to cable operators. 
The competition authority is clearly promoting an active industrial policy in 
order to adapt the new industry to its view on what competition should be 
and to limit the advantages of the incumbent. 
Triple play and the merger of regulatory bodies  
Convergence at the technological and market levels has led to integration 
at the regulatory level. In the UK, Communications Act of 2003 21 gave 
Ofcom 22 the authority to regulate communications. Ofcom combines powers 
                     
19 See: http://www.oft.gov.uk/News/Press+releases/2005/235-05.htm. 
20 See: http://www.cfc.gob.mx/. 
21 See: http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2003/20030021.htm. 
22 See: http://www.ofcom.org.uk/. 
C. CRAMPES & A. HOLLANDER 69 
previously held by five regulators 23. The old regulators have been 
disbanded and many members of their staff have been transferred to Ofcom. 
  Conclusions 
Bundling strategies are risky and likely to profit firms, not consumers. Will 
the same hold true in the communication, information and entertainment 
industry where modern bundling takes the form of triple play? 
On efficiency grounds, most of the arguments that motivate bundling in a 
monopoly framework are negative: at best, it is a way of discriminating in 
markets where a firm already exerts some monopoly power, at worst it 
allows a firm with monopoly power in one market to leverage this power to 
conquer a second market. This explains why courts should not take a 
positive view of a regional telephone company unilaterally tying local phone 
services and DSL. Nevertheless, triple play and quadruple play open up new 
perspectives. They are a reciprocal attempt to cross invade neighboring 
markets by firms that are well installed in their native market. In other words, 
triple-play looks like the unavoidable extension of competition due to the 
digitalization of pictures, sounds and data. It is unavoidable because the ICE 
firms face a prisoner's dilemma. For these firms, limiting their business 
activities to their incumbency sector is not an equilibrium strategy: when the 
bundling strategy is adopted by one of the firms in a market, the others have 
no choice but to follow. Moreover, to benefit from network externalities, the 
firms must install a large base of clients, which gives them the incentive to 
play first, thereby accelerating the transition. 
Due to the lack of relevant economic modeling of the phenomenon, it is 
hard to predict whether there is a risk of natural monopolization. Is there 
room for one single national champion or, on the contrary, is it time for real 
competition at last? Indications are that control of the gateway box will 
become essential to remain in the ICE markets. Based on the economic 
pattern of telecommunications established in most developed contries, one 
can expect that open access to the gateway box will be a key element of the 
new regulatory framework in the ICE industry.  
                     
23 Specifically the Independent Television Commission, the Broadcasting Standards 
Commission, the Radio Authority, the Radio communications Agency and Oftel. 
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